Hasty changes to the machinery of government can disrupt departments for up to two years by White, Anne & Dunleavy, Patrick
blogs.lse.ac.uk
Image courtesy of Richard Cawood via Flickr
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2010/05/13/hasty-changes-to-the-machinery-of-government-
can-disrupt-departments-for-up-to-two-years/
Hasty changes to the machinery of government can disrupt
departments for up to two years
May 13 2010
Prime Ministers who are new in government or who are facing difficulties, often
reorganize Whitehall as a way of demonstrating impact. Yet Anne White  and Patrick
Dunleavy show that this approach often has substantial costs, which are particularly
hard to bear in the current climate of budget austerity.
How Prime Ministers design Whitehall departments is crucial for how well the British state
as a whole operates. Machinery of government changes are often announced at short
notice, usually poorly managed and always costly. Current practices are short-termist,
secretive and amateurist. We urgently need a more professional, well-studied and
carefully evaluated approach - with much better parliamentary scrutiny. These are the
key conclusions of our new study published yesterday by the Institute for Government
and the LSE. The report Making and Breaking Whitehall Departments: A guide to
machinery of government changes makes recommendations to improve the long-standing
problems faced when making major changes to the role of Whitehall departments.
We researched our study with interviews with 34 top civil servants, ministerial and No 10
advisors, private sector experts and leading academics. They painted a picture how
decisions made in haste about the shape
of Whitehall can lead to up to two years of
disruption. Of course, we recognise that
some changes to the machinery of
government are necessary, particularly
under a new government with new
priorities. But a far more professional and
planned approach when doing so would
minimise costs and reduce the time it takes
for changes to become fully effective.
In general the top UK official consider that
political motivations have been the primary
drivers of change – leading to poor
planning and unprofessional change
management practices. One interviewee
close to several changes in the study said:
“We do it all the time… You get Number 10 ringing up and saying: “The PM wants to keep X person happy.
What can we give him to do?” . . . When the question comes, very often you only have half an hour to find
the answer. Literally half an hour. Sometimes less.”
Others spoke of ministers in official cars en route to their new departments being suddenly diverted to a
completely different department, after the PM had changed his mind in mid-reorganization about who should
go where and with what brief.
The report identifies four specific key themes to machinery of government changes:
Reorganizations are announced at short notice: The transition teams tasked with redesigning or
creating entirely new departments were often forced to ‘go live’ with insufficient time to plan and with
little or no resources in terms of staffing, buildings or equipment. The creation of the Department for
Energy and Climate Change, for instance, is reported to have been created in just one night.
There is no extra funding: New departments are allocated insufficient budgets to cover the set-up or
corporate overhead functions. The report agrees with the NAO that wholly new departments cost at
least £15m in additional costs and all changes can incur substantial costs due to differential pay
settlements and productivity losses. The Department for Work and Pensions, for example, is estimated
to cost almost £175m.
Key staff are overloaded: Once departments are ‘live’, top officials and transition teams find
themselves with a double workload, running day-to-day operations while also undertaking the strategic
planning needed for new or reorganized departments. Most significantly changed departments are
reported to require two to three years to refocus and to begin to realise the benefits of the change.
There is far too little central support: The Cabinet Office and Treasury do not have the resources
to provide effective support to new departments. The report finds that staff tasked to advise and
support department changes lack the professional skills, financial and staff resources to do so
effectively.
Changing the system so as to improve future reorganizations
The report proposes four changes to the process of machinery of government changes to enable politicians
and officials to strike a better balance between the political imperative to change department structures and
good administration:
1. Changes should be announced early enough to allow effective planning for the transition:
Departmental reorganisations should be unlinked from the immediate context of ministerial reshuffle
announcements. Departments should not be created until at least four weeks after they are announced,
giving time for initial preparation and set-up. Any large-scale changes should not be implemented until after
an affirmative parliamentary resolution (point 2 below). The current conventions of maintaining extreme
secrecy about prospective changes of department structures should be abandoned.
2. An affirmative parliamentary resolution should be required within six months of a reorganisation:
All departmental reconfigurations should require an affirmative parliamentary resolution when transfer of
functions orders are laid and before substantial reorganisation work begins. Parliament should have an
opportunity to consider departmental changes in a detailed way before a vote is held, possibly in the Liaison
Committee of Select Committee chairs in the House of Commons, or possibly in a joint meeting of relevant
departmental select committees. The Treasury must be more realistic in recognising that new and heavily
reorganised departments will necessarily incur extra costs for at least their first year, this should factored into
reorganisation planning.
3. New and radically changed departments should receive more support from the centre: The Cabinet
Office and Treasury need to improve their procedures and capabilities to provide more positive support for
new or heavily reorganised departments. The Cabinet Office should create a capacity to provide a ‘scratch
team’ to run a new department’s core responsiveness operations for a transition period. The Cabinet Office
should recognise that the reorganisation of departments is a vital task that is likely to recur reasonably
frequently, and should henceforth be properly documented and continuously improved over time – instead of
the current situation where experience resets to zero in each new case.
4. Post-change assessments: The cost-benefit analysis, business plan and strategic change programme
originally submitted to Parliament should provide a focus for the relevant departmental select committee to
assess the benefits and costs of changes, assisted by staff from the National Audit Office, within 18 months
to two years. By this time changes should have ‘bedded in’ and differential pay or productivity dip problems
should be evident.
Launching the report, Lord Bichard, the Executive Director of the Institute for Government commented:
“The power of British Prime Ministers to rearrange Whitehall departments serves as a powerful tool to meet
new and emerging policy challenges.  But snap decisions made with little scrutiny, support or time to plan
can affect a department’s performance for up two years, on top of the huge costs involved. A more
professional and considered approach to making changes to Whitehall departments is now essential.”
